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Disability Law and the Case for Evidence-Based Triage
in a Pandemic
Govind Persad
abstract. This Essay explains why model policies proposed or adopted in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic that allocate scarce medical resources by using medical evidence to pursue
two core goals—saving more lives and saving more years of life—are compatible and consonant
with disability law. Disability law, properly understood, permits considering medical evidence
about patients’ probability of surviving treatment and the quantity of scarce treatments they will
likely use. It also permits prioritizing health workers, and considering patients’ post-treatment life
expectancy. These factors, when based on medical evidence and not inaccurate stereotypes, are
legal to consider even if they disadvantage some patients with specific disabilities.
It then discusses the ethical advantages of triage policies that use medical evidence to save more
lives and years of life, which I call “evidence-based triage,” focusing on the benefits of these policies
for patients with disabilities. In doing so, I explain why recent critiques err by treating people with
disabilities as a monolith, overlooking the political disadvantages of less-visible victims, and treating the social origins of scarcity as a justification for saving fewer lives. Evidence-based triage parallels other policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, like physical distancing and postponement of medical procedures, which may burden patients with specific disabilities or medical
conditions but are nevertheless justified because they save more patients.

introduction
The rapid spread of COVID-19 in the United States, fueled by a haphazard
federal response, has led to a scarcity of potentially lifesaving treatments for
COVID-19 patients. This scarcity has prompted states to develop or revise plans
for fairly distributing access to these treatments. And it has prompted articles in
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high-profile medical journals delineating principles for fair allocation of ventilators, intensive-care beds, therapeutics, and other scarce treatments,1 and the development of model triage guidelines for hospitals.2 These proposals agree on
the importance of saving more lives, saving more years of life, and not using
quality-of-life judgments.3 They aim to save more lives by prioritizing frontline
health workers who can then return to helping others, and by prioritizing patients who can benefit most from treatment—patients who are neither so healthy
that they will likely recover without the scarce treatment, nor so ill that they are
unlikely to recover even with it.4

1.

2.

3.

4.

See, e.g., Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Govind Persad, et al., Fair Allocation of Scarce Medical Resources in
the Time of Covid-19, 382 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2049 (2020); Douglas B. White & Bernard Lo, A
Framework for Rationing Ventilators and Critical Care Beds During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 323
JAMA 1773 (2020).
Douglas B. White et al., Allocation of Scarce Critical Care Resources During a Public Health Emergency, U. PITT. (Apr. 15, 2020), https://ccm.pitt.edu/sites/default/files/UnivPittsburgh
_ModelHospitalResourcePolicy_2020_04_15.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5CK-AA4C].
Importantly, they also agree that saving more years of life is a lower-priority and more constrained aim than saving more lives. See White et al., supra note 2, at 1773; Emanuel et al.,
supra note 1, at 2052.
Emanuel et al., supra note 1, at 2052 (stating that, under their approach, “people who are sick
but could recover if treated are given priority over those who are unlikely to recover even if
treated and those who are likely to recover without treatment”).
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The proposed adoption of these and other triage guidelines has prompted
criticism.5 Some critics focus on state guidelines that use “quality of life” judgments, a criticism I endorse.6 But many also reject methods of triage that aim
only to save more lives and years of life. Critics of triage instead urge alternative
solutions such as:
1. Random selection: Selecting patients by lottery,7 or first come, first served,8
without regard to their prospect of benefit.
2. Minimal triage: Considering only whether a patient can benefit, irrespective of likelihood or magnitude of benefit, or the likely quantity of resources required for benefit.9

5.

6.

7.
8.
9.
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See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Who Gets the Ventilator? Disability Discrimination in COVID-19
Medical-Rationing Protocols, 130 YALE L.J.F. 1 (2020); Deborah Hellman & Kate Nicholson,
Rationing and Disability in a State of Crisis (Va. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No.
2020-33, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3570088 [https://perma.cc/CE5L-NDUK]; Colin
Killick & Marlene Sallo, Letter, Disability Community Will Fight Any Attempt to Discriminate
over Scarce Medical Resources, BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 17, 2020, 5:12 PM), https://www.bostonglobe
.com/2020/03/18/opinion/disabililty-community-will-fight-any-attempt-discriminate-over
-scare-medical-resources [https://perma.cc/8ZR7-ZMQ8]; Ari Ne’eman, Opinion, ‘I Will
Not Apologize for My Needs’, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020
/03/23/opinion/coronavirus-ventilators-triage-disability.html
[https://perma.cc/84A2HFF9]; Preventing Discrimination in the Treatment of COVID-19 Patients: The Illegality of Medical Rationing on the Basis of Disability, DISABILITY RTS. EDUC. & DEF. FUND (Mar. 25, 2020),
https://dredf.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/DREDF-Policy-Statement-on-COVID-19
-and-Medical-Rationing-3-25-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/FTS7-JN3S] [hereinafter Preventing Discrimination]; Letter from David Carlson, Dir. of Advocacy of Disability Rights, Disability Rights Wash., to Roger Severino, Dir., Oﬃce for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.centerforpublicrep.org/wp-content/uploads
/2020/03/OCR-Complaint_3-23-20-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/3A93-NK4P] [hereinafter
Washington Complaint].
See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 5; Ne’eman, supra note 5; Preventing Discrimination, supra note
5; see also Emanuel et al., supra note 1, at 4 (recommending “against incorporating patients’
future quality of life, and quality-adjusted life-years” into triage guidelines); White et al.,
supra note 2, at 2 (excluding “assessments of quality of life”). I therefore agree, for instance,
with criticisms of recent state triage policies that categorically exclude certain patients who
need assistance with activities of daily living. See Michelle M. Mello, Govind Persad & Douglas
B. White, Respecting Disability Rights—Toward Improved Crisis Standards of Care, NEW ENG. J.
MED. (2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2011997 [https://perma.cc
/8NH9-53H8].
Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 4. Bagenstos believes a lottery is permissible, though not required.
Ne’eman, supra note 5; Preventing Discrimination, supra note 5, at 9.
See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 12, 15; Preventing Discrimination, supra note 5, at 8; Killick &
Sallo, supra note 5 (“Should hospitals prioritize those with the least resource-intensive needs
or exclude from access to life-sustaining care those with lower survival probabilities, they
would be engaging in discrimination.”).
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This Essay argues that triage guidelines that use medical evidence about patients’ prospect of benefit to pursue the twin aims of saving more lives and more
years of life (which I call “evidence-based triage”) are legally and ethically preferable to random selection or minimal triage.10 I argue that evidence-based triage is fully consistent with recognizing the legal and moral equality of each person and emphasizing our duties to the most vulnerable.
In Part I, I explain why the two core goals of evidence-based triage—saving
more lives and saving more years of life—are compatible, and even consonant,
with disability law. In Part II, I discuss normative arguments for evidence-based
triage, highlighting the argument that evidence-based triage will benefit many
patients with disabilities, and is even likely to save more patients with disabilities
than random selection or minimal triage would. While random selection or minimal triage have the surface appearance of equity, they prevent individualized
assessment of each patient’s medical situation, leading to worse outcomes for
many patients with disabilities and ignoring relevant diﬀerences between disabilities. Although I present these Parts together, the doctrinal points in Part I do
not require the correctness of the normative claims in Part II, nor do those normative claims depend on the persistence of the legal precedents Part I describes.
i. why evidence-based triage is legal
In this Part, I defend the legality of evidence-based triage, focusing first on
saving more lives and then on saving more years of life. As an initial matter, recent Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) guidance does not preclude evidence-based triage. Rather, it distinguishes relevant and irrelevant considerations, stating that “persons with disabilities should not be denied medical
care on the basis of stereotypes, assessments of quality of life, or judgments
about a person’s relative ‘worth’ based on the presence or absence of disabilities,”
and that decisions “concerning whether an individual is a candidate for treatment should be based on an individualized assessment of the patient based on
the best available objective medical evidence.”11 Stereotypes and judgments of
relative worth not only risk unfairness to patients with disabilities—they hinder

10.

11.

The model guidelines discussed at the outset exemplify evidence-based triage. See White et
al., supra note 2. As I explain below, evidence-based triage does not use quality-of-life judgments and does not exclude people merely on the basis that they have a disability; rather, it
makes individualized judgments.
Oﬃce of Civil Rights, Bulletin: Civil Rights, HIPAA, and the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID19), U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. 1 (Mar. 28, 2020) https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default
/files/ocr-bulletin-3-28-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4SQ-VRZK] [hereinafter Bulletin].
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eﬀorts to save more lives and years of life by introducing irrelevant considerations. I likewise agree with HHS and with disability advocates that quality-oflife judgments are likely to incorporate unjust biases that preclude their use in
pandemic triage.12
In contrast, the aim of saving more lives is widely championed in COVID-19
response both inside and outside triage contexts.13 Wide cross sections of both
laypeople and theorists endorse it.14 Both this aim and that of saving more years

12.

Some have proposed strategies for incorporating quality-of-life determinations into health
policy while combating bias. E.g., Anirban Basu, Josh Carlson & David Veenstra, Health Years
in Total: A New Health Objective Function for Cost-Eﬀectiveness Analysis, 23 VALUE HEALTH 96,
98 (2020); Nir Eyal, Measuring Health-State Utility via Cured Patients, in DISABILITY, HEALTH,
LAW, AND BIOETHICS 266, 266-79 (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., 2020); Govind Persad, Considering Quality of Life While Repudiating Disability Injustice: A Pathways Approach to Setting Priorities, 47 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 294, 300-01 (2019). But these newer approaches are better suited
to setting health system priorities than comparing individuals, and would require data collection that is impractical in a pandemic. See Emanuel et al., supra note 1, at 4.
13. See, e.g., FAQ for DHHS Omnibus EO, N.C. OFF. GOVERNOR 1 (Apr. 9, 2020),
https://files.nc.gov/governor/documents/files/FAQ-for-DHHS-Omnibus-EO.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9WWE-PKHW] (“The actions taken by this Order allow for . . . transfer [of] medical resources where they can be most eﬀective and save the most lives.”); Rapid Expert Consultation on Crisis Standards of Care for the COVID-19 Pandemic, NAT’L ACAD. SCI., ENGINEERING & MED. 1 (Mar. 28, 2020), https://files.asprtracie.hhs.gov/documents/nap-rapid-expert
-consultation-on-csc-for-covid-19-pandemic.pdf [https://perma.cc/GJ5W-C2TG] (noting
that crisis standards of care “strive to save the most lives possible”); New Mexico COVID-19
Update: One Death, ST. N.M. (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.newmexico.gov/2020
/03/25/new-mexico-covid-19-update-one-death [https://perma.cc/V6NL-WKDQ] (stating that “[s]ocial distancing and isolation” are needed “to save more lives and prevent more
deaths”); COVID-19 Update: Congregate Care Unified Response Teams, OHIO DEP’T HEALTH
(May 26, 2020), https://coronavirus.ohio.gov/wps/portal/gov/covid-19/resources/news
-releases-news-you-can-use/congregate-care-response
[https://perma.cc/HY4J-2BNJ]
(statement of Gov. Mike DeWine) (“As we continue to ramp up our testing in Ohio, we must
deploy our resources in a way that will save the most lives.”); Remarks by President Trump, Vice
President Pence, and Members of the Coronavirus Task Force in Press Briefing, U.S. WHITE HOUSE
(Apr. 5, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-presidenttrump-vice-president-pence-members-coronavirus-task-force-press-briefing-19 [https://
perma.cc/55K6-RS6W] (statement of Dr. Deborah Birx) (praising the “healthcare workers
who are doing every single thing humanly possible to save more lives”).
14. See sources infra Part II and notes 70-74 (describing the endorsement of saving more lives by
laypeople and by numerous non-utilitarian ethicists). Notably, while utilitarian ethicists may
often prefer saving more lives over random selection or minimal triage, saving more lives is
not utilitarian. See Julian Savulescu, James Cameron & Dominic Wilkinson, Equality or Utility?
Ethics and Law of Rationing Ventilators, BRIT. J. ANAESTHESIA (Apr. 20, 2020), https://
bjanaesthesia.org/article/S0007-0912(20)30223-3/fulltext [https://perma.cc/Y777-478D]
(explaining that utilitarianism requires considering quality of life, and criticizing as non-utilitarian an approach that maximizes “the numbers of lives saved”). Contra Hellman & Nicholson, supra note 5, at 1 (claiming that saving “as many lives as possible” is a “fully utilitarian
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of life can be pursued without reliance on unfair classifications; pursuing these
goals only requires recognizing the equal value of all patients’ lives, and of every
year within those lives.15 Notably, the HHS Oﬃce of Civil Rights closed a civilrights complaint against the Pennsylvania Department of Health as satisfactorily
resolved after Pennsylvania removed language that singled out specific disabilities and added language about individualized assessments; the revised guidelines continue to incorporate assessments of patients’ prospect of benefit with
the aim of saving more lives and years of life.16
Although there is little precedent applying disability law to the allocation of
scarce, lifesaving treatments, organ allocation is the closest analogy. Organ allocation policies align more closely with evidence-based triage than do random
selection or minimal triage. Most notably, lung allocation policy considers candidates’ probability of post-transplant survival.17 Kidney allocation policy also
considers survival, and allocation policies for all organs consider medical factors
that aﬀect survival, such as immunological matching.18 Legal precedent also recognizes that probability of survival is a legitimate basis for organ allocation.19

15.

16.

17.

18.
19.

approach”). Saving more lives certainly is not the “ruthless utilitarianism” criticized by the
Oﬃce of Civil Rights. See Bulletin, supra note 11.
Cf. Wendy F. Hensel & Leslie E. Wolf, Playing God: The Legality of Plans Denying Scarce Resources to People with Disabilities in Public Health Emergencies, 63 FLA. L. REV. 719, 759 (2011)
(supporting the use of the Sequential Organ Failure Assessment scoring system in pandemic
triage and noting that “the use of medical eﬀectiveness in this manner is not based on stereotypes, generalizations, or myths about disabilities”).
See HHS Press Oﬃce, OCR Resolves Civil Rights Complaint Against Pennsylvania After It Revises
Its Pandemic Health Care Triaging Policies to Protect Against Disability Discrimination, U.S. DEP’T
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about
/news/2020/04/16/ocr-resolves-civil-rights-complaint-against-pennsylvania-after-it-revises
-its-pandemic-health-care.html [https://perma.cc/E2R4-EXR5]; Interim Pennsylvania Crisis
Standards of Care for Pandemic Guidelines, Version 2, PA. DEP’T HEALTH & HOSP. & HEALTHSYSTEM ASS’N PA., 29-31 (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.health.pa.gov/topics/Documents
/Diseases%20and%20Conditions/COVID-19%20Interim%20Crisis%20Standards%20of
%20Care.pdf [https://perma.cc/UZ6S-MJTV].
Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, How Organ Allocation Works, U.S. DEP’T.
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/learn/about-transplantation
/how-organ-allocation-works [https://perma.cc/HC8V-5QXF]. Notably, the National
Council on Disability’s recent report neither criticized the use of survival probabilities in organ
allocation nor advocated for the use of a “first-come, first-serve” system, but instead emphasized that organ allocation must be based on medical evidence, not stereotypes or quality-oflife judgments about patients with disabilities. Organ Transplant Discrimination Against People
with Disabilities, NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY 45 (Sept. 25, 2019), https://ncd.gov/sites/default/files/NCD_Organ_Transplant_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8SZ-SRL9] [hereinafter
Organ Transplant Discrimination].
How Organ Allocation Works, supra note 17.
Barnett v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 32 F.3d 413, 417 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that it
is legitimate for “doctors, as part of their professional responsibility,” to pursue “distribution
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These precedents support applying a similar approach to allocating scarce
COVID-19 treatments.
A. Individualized Judgments
Cases applying the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to medical decisions made in nonscarce contexts have often required individualized determinations,20 though distinguished scholars recognize that disability law “does not always require an individualized inquiry.”21 In a pandemic, the time needed to
make individualized judgments may itself be scarce,22 although HHS asserts that
pandemic triage decisions must nevertheless be individualized.23
Even if we assume, with HHS, that individualized judgments are required in
pandemic triage, this counts for—not against—evidence-based triage, which
employs individualized determinations.24 In contrast, individualization arguably
prohibits random selection, which ignores medical diﬀerences between individual patients.25 In practice, random selection is also susceptible to biased or arbitrary decisions, because it requires initial decisions regarding who is eligible for

20.
21.
22.

23.
24.

25.
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of livers to patients with the best chances of survival” and that “[p]oor survival rate is an
acceptable medical criterion”); Neal v. Christopher & Banks Comprehensive Major Med. Plan,
651 F. Supp. 2d 890, 909-10 (E.D. Wis. 2009) (holding that the “concern that livers be distributed to patients with the best chances of survival is an acceptable medical criterion”); Barnett v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., No. C-92-4908 SBA, 1993 WL 738364, at *7 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 5, 1993) (observing that “[e]very expert who testified agreed that it is necessary and
appropriate to consider available resources at some level in making medical judgments in order to maximize the eﬀective utilization of resources and the survival of patients,” and that
even the plaintiﬀ ’s expert “testified that he would deny transplants to patients with less than
a twenty percent chance of long-term survival even if it was the only treatment available to
save the life”), aﬀ ’d, 32 F.3d 413 (9th Cir. 1994).
See, e.g., Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987); Lesley v. Chie, 250 F.3d 47, 55 (1st Cir.
2001); Sumes v. Andres, 938 F. Supp. 9, 11-12 (D.D.C. 1996).
Hensel & Wolf, supra note 15, at 762; see also Philip G. Peters, Jr., Health Care Rationing and
Disability Rights, 70 IND. L.J. 491, 516 (1995).
See Hensel & Wolf, supra note 15, at 761-62 (analyzing and identifying support for, but not
endorsing, this claim); cf. Lockett v. Catalina Channel Express, Inc., 496 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th
Cir. 2007) (upholding a time-pressured decision to exclude a disabled person from a ferry
lounge based on a reasonable, but non-expert, risk assessment).
See Bulletin, supra note 11, at 1.
Hensel & Wolf, supra note 15, at 759 (noting that triage guidelines that employ an evidencebased scoring system “involve the individualized consideration missing from the categorical
denials that run afoul of the [Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)]”); see White et al., supra
note 2, at 1 (emphasizing the need for individualized assessments).
Cf. Watson v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 827 P.2d 656, 665 (Idaho 1992) (quoting Beakley
v. Optimist Printing Co., 152 P. 212, 214 (Idaho 1915) (“A gambling verdict, such as pitching a
coin or using some other gambling means to determine the result of a trial, is unacceptable
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selection but oﬀers no guidance in making these judgments.26 While triage policies should recognize that medical professionals may be biased against patients
with disabilities,27 the solution is not to encourage unguided eligibility decisions
under time pressure, which are more likely to be biased or arbitrary.28 The better
option is to employ triage policies that constrain and guide decisions by requiring that they be justified using consistently applied medical criteria.29 Evidencebased triage can reduce arbitrariness by ensuring that triage decisionmakers only
have access to medically relevant information and are not privy to medically irrelevant and potentially biasing details, like a patient’s name, gender, race, nationality, or disabilities that are irrelevant to COVID-19 treatment.30
B. Saving More Lives
In this Section, I argue that disability law permits triage approaches that use
medical evidence, including evidence about disabilities that aﬀect a patient’s
chances of survival or the quantity of resources they will require, to pursue the
goal of saving more patients. This approach diverges from the view that a patient’s disability may only be considered if they “will die in the immediate term
from that disability with or without that treatment,” and that triage guidelines
may not deny “treatments to individuals because of their disabilities, when those
individuals can benefit from them,” irrespective of potentially large diﬀerences
in probability of benefit.31 Medicine is permitted to save the most lives, even
when other available options would not be futile.

26.

27.
28.

29.
30.
31.

because ‘there is no discussion or consideration of the merits by the jury.’”)); Carol Necole
Brown, Casting Lots: The Illusion of Justice and Accountability in Property Allocation, 53 BUFF. L.
REV. 65, 113-14 (2005) (criticizing lottery allocation).
Brown, supra note 25, at 126 & n.265 (quoting JON ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGMENTS: STUDIES
IN THE LIMITATIONS OF RATIONALITY 67 (1989) (“I know of no instance of social lotteries without some preselection or postselection scrutiny on the basis of need, merit and the like.”)).
Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 9 & n.31.
Cf. Irene V. Blair et al., An Investigation of Associations Between Clinicians’ Ethnic or Racial Bias
and Hypertension Treatment, Medication Adherence and Blood Pressure Control, 29 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 987, 993 (2014) (“Implicit bias may be more likely to aﬀect care . . . in decisions
made under time pressure, with limited information or without the benefit of clear guidelines.”).
Id.
See Mello, Persad, & White, supra note 6, at 4.
Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 20, 25.
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1. Considering Probability of Survival
Some patients may have a lower probability of survival than others due to
specific disabilities. Before defending minimal triage, Samuel Bagenstos concedes that “an individual’s disability may make it impossible or impracticable for
them to satisfy certain eligibility criteria, even if the criteria are defined with no
reference to disability,”32 and illustrates this via the example of a blind bus driver.
Because blindness completely prevents safe driving, not hiring blind drivers is
legal. But the bus driver analogy also justifies considering disabilities that make
safe driving less probable, such as color blindness or epilepsy.33 The same should
be true for disabilities that aﬀect survival but do not make treatment futile.
Bagenstos argues that because the goal of rationing treatment is not universally agreed upon, appropriate eligibility criteria for scarce treatments are diﬃcult to discern.34 But saving lives is a core goal of medicine and of COVID-19
response in particular, unlike maximizing the “prospective economic output of
those we save.”35 It is endorsed in case law discussing the distribution of other
scarce treatments, most notably transplants.36 It requires no judgments about
the value of life with a disability.37
It is plausible—though contestable—that decisions about which patients will
receive scarce medical treatments are governed by disability discrimination law.38
32.
33.

34.
35.
36.

37.

38.

34

Id. at 8.
See, e.g., Shannon v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 332 F.3d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 2003) (upholding color
diﬀerentiation as an essential qualification for driving a bus under the ADA); Ward v. Skinner,
943 F.2d 157, 159 (1st Cir. 1991) (denying a procedural challenge to a general agency rule forbidding epileptic truck drivers).
Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 7-10.
Id. at 8. Bagenstos does not identify triage guidelines that consider, or aim to maximize, patients’ economic output.
Regarding transplants, see supra note 19. Regarding other resources, see, for example, Estate
of Cole v. Fromm, 941 F. Supp. 776, 784 (S.D. Ind. 1995), aﬀ ’d, 94 F.3d 254 (7th Cir. 1996),
which permits the allocation of scarce suicide-prevention resources to patients at highest risk,
and Henderson v. Tanner, No. CV 15-804-SDD-EWD, 2019 WL 885914, at *11 (M.D. La. Feb.
22, 2019), which discusses federal guidelines for prisoners’ access to scarce Hepatitis C medications, which “reflect the balancing of limited resources and the need for medical treatment
by prioritizing the greatest medical need and the highest likelihood of success for each given
patient.”
Cf. Hensel & Wolf, supra note 15, at 759 (supporting the use of the Sequential Organ Failure
Assessment scoring system in pandemic triage and noting that “the use of medical eﬀectiveness in this manner is not based on stereotypes, generalizations, or myths about disabilities”).
Compare Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 6-7 (arguing that the ADA applies to medical treatment
decisions), with Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2005) (“The
Rehabilitation Act, like the ADA, was never intended to apply to decisions involving the termination of life support or medical treatment.”), Burger v. Bloomberg, 418 F.3d 882, 883 (8th
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But the cases finding that providers have illegally discriminated involve groundless judgments or invidious stereotypes, not factually grounded prediction. The
Supreme Court’s ruling against a provider who refused to treat a patient with
HIV rested on the provider’s failure to provide “objective, scientific information”
that would make refusal “reasonable in light of the available medical evidence.”39
Lower court opinions likewise diﬀerentiate groundless or biased decisions from
those grounded in legitimate, even if disputable, medical evidence.40 And courts
resolve uncertainty in favor of medical decisionmakers who are making goodfaith eﬀorts to ground their decisions in evidence.41
2. Considering Quantity of Resources Required
Patients with certain disabilities may require more of a scarce treatment than
others do. The American Medical Association recognizes this may be a legitimate
medical consideration in absolute scarcity.42 Yet some recent disability advocacy
rejects it.43

39.
40.

41.

42.

43.

Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (“[A] lawsuit under the Rehab Act or the [ADA] cannot be based on
medical treatment decisions.”), and Sharona Hoﬀman, Preparing for Disaster: Protecting the
Most Vulnerable in Emergencies, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1491, 1525 (2009) (“Precedent establishes that patients will not be successful in suing healthcare providers for ADA or Rehabilitation Act violations relating to good-faith medical treatment decisions.”).
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 650 (1998).
See, e.g., McGugan v. Aldana-Bernier, 752 F.3d 224, 234 (2d Cir. 2014); Lesley v. Chie, 250 F.3d
47, 58 (1st Cir. 2001); Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289, 1299 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc);
Sumes v. Andres, 938 F. Supp. 9, 12 (D.D.C. 1996); Woolfolk v. Duncan, 872 F. Supp. 1381,
1390-91 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
McGugan, 752 F.3d at 234; Lesley, 250 F.3d at 58. This point is relevant to concerns that evidence-based triage approaches may lead to mistakes due to limited evidence. See Bagenstos,
supra note 5, at 20. It is important to work to improve the accuracy of evidence-based approaches, but they need not be perfect to be legal. This is so in particular because a resource
that does not go to one patient will benefit another. Where, as in the allocation of medical
resources, the interests of potential beneficiaries are balanced such that they “share the risk of
error in roughly equal fashion,” it is appropriate to use a preponderance-of-evidence approach, rather than a heightened standard that “expresses a preference for one side’s interests.”
See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 (1983) (quoting Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979)). The allocation of scarce medical resources among individuals is not
analogous to contexts, like the criminal law or civil commitment, where a single individual's
established interests conflict with those of a governmental actor. See Addington, 441 U.S. at
427.
Allocating Limited Health Care Resources: Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 11.1.3, AM. MED. ASS’N,
https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/allocating-limited-health-care-resources
[https://perma.cc/VHE7-CY65] [hereinafter Allocating Limited Health Care Resources].
See, e.g., Killick & Sallo, supra note 5 (“Should hospitals prioritize those with the least resource-intensive needs or exclude from access to life-sustaining care those with lower survival
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Several disability law precedents are consistent with considering the quantity
of resources a patient is likely to require. The first is Alexander v. Choate, which
permits the provision of an equal quantum of resources to all patients, even if
this produces unequal outcomes for patients with specific disabilities.44 The second is Olmstead v. L.C., which concludes that limited resources can justify refusing to maximally accommodate people with specific disabilities when doing so
would deprive others—including people with other disabilities—whom the state
is also bound to protect.45 The third is precedent defining reasonable accommodation: disability law does not require “an accommodation that would result in
other employees having to work harder or longer.”46 The fourth is the permission
provided in disability law to exclude a person from a program in order to protect
others’ health or lives.47 In explaining this doctrine, courts state that disability
law aims to counter “prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear,”48 while giving
appropriate weight to genuine threats to others’ health and safety, and that “the
need to protect public health may at times outweigh the rights of disabled individuals.”49
Bagenstos argues that providers should be required to “take steps to ensure
that those who are not qualified for life-saving treatments can become qualified.”50 Patients with disabilities should of course receive nonscarce resources

44.

45.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
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probabilities, they would be engaging in discrimination.”); Preventing Discrimination, supra
note 5, at 8 (similar).
469 U.S. 287, 303 (1985) (upholding a state’s Medicaid policy that guaranteed fourteen days
of inpatient treatment to all patients, rejecting the view that Medicaid entitles each patient to
“that level of health care precisely tailored to his or her particular needs,” and concluding that
Medicaid benefits need not be altered to respond to the greater medical needs of patients with
specific disabilities); cf. Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 21 (conceding that Health and Human
Services (HHS) endorses consideration of “the cost of medical procedures, the length of hospital stays, prevention of death, and prevention of contagious diseases” (quoting ADA Analyses of the Oregon Health Care Plan, 9 ISSUES L. & MED. 397, 411 (1994))). Although Choate is a
Rehabilitation Act rather than an ADA case, it is often regarded as applicable to the ADA as
well. See e.g., Theriault v. Flynn, 162 F.3d 46, 48 & n.3 (1st Cir. 1998); Mark C. Weber, Disability Discrimination by State and Local Government: The Relationship Between Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1089, 1115 (1995).
Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 604 (1999) (plurality opinion) (permitting a
state to show that “in the allocation of available resources, immediate relief for the plaintiﬀs
would be inequitable, given the responsibility the State has undertaken for the care and treatment of a large and diverse population of persons with mental disabilities”).
Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 101 F.3d 1090, 1094 (5th Cir. 1996).
See, e.g., Doe v. Woodford Cty. Bd. of Educ., 213 F.3d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 2000).
Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287-88 (1987).
Woodford, 213 F.3d at 925 (quoting Montalvo v. Radcliﬀe, 167 F.3d 873, 876 (4th Cir. 1999)).
Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 21 n.82.
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that help them become qualified. But whether they, or any patient, should receive
scarce resources to become qualified requires an evidence-based determination
of whether doing so risks depriving other patients, including patients with other
disabilities, of needed resources.51
3. Considering Ability to Benefit Others
Evidence-based triage also typically prioritizes healthcare workers.52 Doing
so helps save more patients, especially those whose illnesses or disabilities make
them likelier to require the assistance of skilled professionals. Although random
selection and minimal triage would prohibit this prioritization, such a prohibition lacks legal support. Prioritizing healthcare workers, even if they are less
likely to be disabled than others,53 does not constitute illegal discrimination, because prioritizing healthcare workers is “necessary for the provision” of scarce
treatments.54
C. Saving More Years of Life
The American Medical Association’s discussion of fairly allocating scarce resources encompasses duration of benefit as well as likelihood of benefit.55 Importantly, evidence-based predictions about the number of years a patient can
gain from treatment fundamentally diﬀer from subjective judgments about qual-

51.

52.
53.
54.

55.

Cf. Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138-39 (2d Cir. 1995) (providing an example of a “modification” that “would be unreasonable because of its excessive costs,” and
explaining that the “nature and cost” of an accommodation are relevant when assessing
whether it is legally required).
See, e.g., Emanuel et al., supra note 1, at 5; White et al., supra note 2, at 8.
See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 12 (describing the underrepresentation of people with disabilities among medical professionals).
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8) (2019). While there are no cases applying this provision to triage
policies that prioritize healthcare workers, courts have interpreted it to uphold, for instance,
academic requirements for trainee health workers against disability discrimination challenges.
See Maples v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston, 901 F. Supp. 2d 874, 883-84 (S.D. Tex.
2012) (“Requiring high standards for future physician assistants is necessary for the proper
treatment of patients.”), aﬀ ’d, 524 F. App’x 93 (5th Cir. 2013). The availability of healthcare
workers is similarly necessary for proper patient care.
Allocating Limited Health Care Resources, supra note 42. The goal of lengthening lives is also
adopted in organ allocation policy. See Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network,
Board Approves Enhanced Liver Distribution System, U.S. DEP’T. HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/news/board-approves-enhanced-liver-distribution-system
[https://perma.cc/FG2U-HGGA] (praising a policy revision that “puts more appropriate emphasis on medical criteria that save and lengthen lives”).
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ity of life. A patient’s unique perspective on their own quality of life merits deference.56 But patients lack similar expertise regarding their future lifespan. Lifeexpectancy ranges can be predicted for patients with certain illnesses or disabilities,57 based on verifiable outcomes—how many patients with a given condition
survive for a specified length of time—rather than on subjective, unverifiable beliefs.58 Short- and long-term life-expectancy predictions are central to damages
calculations in tort cases.59 Shorter-term predictions are employed to determine
eligibility for scarce antiviral treatments60 and hospice care,61 as well as to prioritize patients for access to experimental treatments and consultations about end-

56.

57.

58.

59.

60.

61.

38

Here I agree with Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 13-15. Quality-of-life judgments come nearest to
justifiability in the rare cases where some patients (e.g., those in a persistent vegetative state)
are unable to communicate about their quality of life, no matter what accommodations are
oﬀered. Relying on others’ judgments about their quality of life would not inappropriately
ignore their “inside” perspective, because that perspective is inaccessible. Cf. Bagenstos, supra
note 5 at 14 (contrasting “inside” and “outside” perspectives on disability); Alicia Ouellette,
Disability and the End of Life, 85 OR. L. REV. 123, 174-75 (2006) (distinguishing persistent vegetative state from disability); Persad, supra note 12, at 297 (noting that comatose patients are
unable to provide first-person testimony). But suﬃciently high-quality “outside” judgments
about these patients’ quality of life are likely impractical in a pandemic.
E.g., Cancer Facts & Figures 2019, AM. CANCER SOC’Y (2019), https://www.cancer.org/content
/dam/cancer-org/research/cancer-facts-and-statistics/annual-cancer-facts-and-figures
/2019/cancer-facts-and-figures-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/P3CT-SPLP] (discussing predicted life expectancy for cancer patients).
As the example of predictions grounded in verifiable outcomes indicates, subjective hunches
need not play a role in life-expectancy predictions, nor are life-expectancy predictions proxies
for quality-of-life judgments. Contra Letter from Disability Rights North Carolina to Roger
Severino, Dir., Oﬃce for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., (May 5, 2020),
https://disabilityrightsnc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/OCR-Complaint-5.5.20.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BP4P-2FZR].
E.g., Luwisch v. Am. Marine Corp., 956 F.3d 320, 329 (5th Cir. 2020) (observing that life expectancy is relevant to monetary awards for lost wages, as is “evidence that a particular person,
by virtue of his health or occupation or other factors, is likely to live and work a longer, or
shorter, period than the average” (quoting DePerrodil v. Bozovic Marine, Inc., 842 F.3d 352,
361 (5th Cir. 2016))); Conwed Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 443 F.3d 1032, 1043 (8th Cir.
2006) (“An award for impairment of earning capacity should be based on an evaluation of
such factors as age, life expectancy, health . . . .”).
E.g., Hoﬀer v. Inch, 382 F. Supp. 3d 1288, 1311-12 (N.D. Fla. 2019) (reporting the use of eighteen-month life expectancy in state and federal guidelines for prisoner eligibility for Hepatitis
C treatment).
42 U.S.C. § 1395x(dd)(3)(A) (2018) (“An individual is considered to be ‘terminally ill’ if . . .
the individual’s life expectancy is 6 months or less.”); United States v. AseraCare, Inc., 938
F.3d 1278, 1292-93 (11th Cir. 2019) (explaining the application of the “terminally ill” standard
to hospice care eligibility). Some states condition access to physician-assisted dying on terminal illness. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-48-103 (West 2020).
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of-life treatment preferences.62 Even those who question life-expectancy predictions are uncertain whether to categorically reject them, or instead to limit their
use to short-term life expectancy.63
Bagenstos argues that even if some disabilities genuinely limit life expectancy, it would be unfair to consider this when setting priorities.64 As an ethical
matter, I agree that using shorter-term life-expectancy predictions, as both lung
allocation and model triage guidelines do,65 is desirable because it captures the
direct eﬀects of conditions that limit short-term survival regardless of social arrangements, while striving to screen out the eﬀects of social injustice on overall
lifespan.66 Short-term predictions also reduce concerns about uncertainty.
As a doctrinal matter, however, the law permits consideration of disabilities
that limit lifespan, even when disability would not limit lifespan in a just world.
As described in Section I.B.1, the law permits evidence-based medical judgments
even when they disadvantage patients with certain disabilities. For instance,
courts were legally justified to base their decisions on the risk HIV presented
under prevailing social conditions,67 even when doing so exacerbated the disadvantage or inconvenience people with HIV experienced and even though HIV
would have been less deadly had society acted justly and pursued a cure earlier.
62.

63.

64.
65.

66.

67.

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-483c (West 2012) (permitting patients with a life expectancy of
two years or less an expedited appeal from experimental treatment denial); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 449A.551 (West 2019) (directing healthcare providers to explain the availability and
features of a Provider Order for Life-Sustaining Treatment form to any patient with a “life
expectancy of less than 5 years”).
Compare Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 9 n.30 (arguing that we should not use “quantity-of-life
measures such as the number of expected life-years saved”), with Who Gets Care, TRADEOFFS
(Apr. 14, 2020), https://tradeoﬀs.org/2020/04/14/who-gets-care [https://perma.cc/ZG44N264] (reporting the statement of Bagenstos that “the safest standard is six months—the
same time frame doctors use to determine hospice eligibility”). See also Organ Transplant Discrimination, supra note 17, at 43-44 (reporting the statement of bioethicist Joseph Stramondo
that while transplant policy should not aim at unconstrained maximization of the number of
life-years saved, a heart transplant “should go to the person who will live 5, 10, or 15 years
with that heart and not the person who will only live 6 months”).
See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 17 & n.67 (discussing the concern that short life expectancy
reflects "societal discrimination").
The model triage guidelines consider only short-term life expectancy. White et al., supra note
2, at 6. The lung transplantation guidelines similarly focus on one-year life expectancy. A
Guide to Calculating the Lung Allocation Score, UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING 6
https://unos.org/wp-content/uploads/unos/lung_allocation_score.pdf [https://perma.cc
/EK93-56NG].
See Cancer Facts & Figures 2019, supra note 57, at 21 (identifying cancers that sharply limit
short-term survival); cf. Persad, supra note 12, at 302 (noting that many disadvantages people
with disabilities face are attributable to social injustice).
See Lesley v. Chie, 250 F.3d 47, 58 (1st Cir. 2001); Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289, 1299 (11th
Cir. 1999).
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Similarly, serious limitations on long-term survival were judged to be an acceptable reason to deny access to a liver transplant.68 Notably, the law also permits triage policies to consider patients’ age.69
ii. why evidence-based triage is ethical
In this Part, I turn from doctrinal to ethical analysis of evidence-based triage.
As a starting point, the aim of saving more lives is widely endorsed.70 Notably,
many ethicists who reject utilitarianism endorse saving more lives, on the basis
that saving more lives comes closest to meaningfully fulfilling our duties to each
person,71 and recognizes the paramount and equal significance of each life.72
68.
69.

70.

71.

72.
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Barnett v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., No. C-92-4908 SBA, 1993 WL 738364, at *7 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 5, 1993), aﬀ ’d, 32 F.3d 413 (9th Cir. 1994).
Contra Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 16 (suggesting that HHS rejected the use of age in triage
policies). While the HHS Oﬃce of Civil Rights recently purported to reject treatment decisions resting on “judgments about a person’s relative ‘worth’ based on . . . age,” Bulletin supra
note 11, HHS’s authority under the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (Age Act) is far more limited than its authority under disability discrimination statutes. The Age Act permits the use
of age-based criteria to achieve the normal operation or statutory objectives of any program,
including both programs authorized by federal law and those authorized by state or local law,
and does not apply to programs that provide “benefits or assistance to persons” based on age
or define “criteria for participation in age-related terms.” 42 U.S.C. § 6103 (2018); see also 45
C.F.R. § 90.13, 90.14 (2020). The Age Act “diﬀers somewhat from the other civil rights statutes in that” it “itself specifies certain categories of age discrimination which will be considered permissible.” NAACP v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290, 316 (D. Del.
1980), aﬀ ’d sub nom. NAACP v. Med. Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981); see Benjamin
Eidelson, Comment, Kidney Allocation and the Limits of the Age Discrimination Act, 122 YALE L.J.
1635, 1651 (2013) (observing that the Age Act permits kidney transplant policies that consider
age, and explaining that the Age Act “incorporated capacious exceptions to its prohibition on
discrimination”). See generally Govind Persad, Evaluating the Legality of Age-Based Criteria in
Health Care: From Nondiscrimination and Discretion to Distributive Justice, 60 B.C. L. REV. 889
(2019) (describing the Age Act’s exceptions and identifying numerous healthcare policies that
consider age).
See sources cited supra note 13; cf. Onishea, 171 F.3d at 1299 (rejecting “the absurd conclusion
that Congress has decreed even a few painful deaths in service of the [Rehabilitation] Act’s
noble goal”).
Tom Dougherty, Rational Numbers: A Non-Consequentialist Explanation of Why You Should
Save the Many and Not the Few, 63 PHIL. Q. 413, 420 (2013); Nien-hê Hsieh, Alan Strudler &
David Wasserman, The Numbers Problem, 34 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 352 (2006).
T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 232-34 (1998); Frances P. Kamm, Health and
Equity, in SUMMARY MEASURES OF POPULATION HEALTH: CONCEPTS, ETHICS, MEASUREMENT
AND APPLICATIONS 685, 685-88 (Christopher J.L. Murray et al. eds., 2002); see also Joint Statement, Moral Guidance on Prioritizing Care During a Pandemic, PUB. DISCOURSE (Apr. 5, 2020),
https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2020/04/62001
[https://perma.cc/75YJ-ZBWC]
[hereinafter Moral Guidance]. Contra John M. Taurek, Should the Numbers Count?, 6 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 293 (1977).
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While saving more years of life engenders more debate, some nonutilitarian ethicists also recognize it as appropriate.73 Diverse participants in recent community
engagement studies of triage policies similarly endorsed considering probability
of survival and—though less strongly—years of life saved.74 These arguments
provide compelling ethical support for evidence-based triage, particularly when
it emphasizes saving more lives and regards saving life-years as a subordinate
and constrained aim.75 Indeed, those willingly accepting social and economic
burdens in order to save more lives might reasonably feel betrayed if triage policies abandoned that goal.
In this Part, I advance a more ambitious ethical argument: evidence-based
triage not only saves more lives overall, but it likely saves more lives among patients with disabilities.76 While this argument is not necessary for evidencebased triage to be ethical, it demonstrates its consonance with the goals of crossdisability advocacy, and helps dispel the mistaken framing of evidence-based triage as primarily burdening people with disabilities while primarily benefiting
people without disabilities.

73.

See, e.g., Samuel J. Kerstein, The Badness of Death for Us, the Worth in Us, and Priorities in Saving
Lives, in SAVING PEOPLE FROM THE HARM OF DEATH (Espen Gamlund & Carl Tollef Solberg
eds., 2019); cf. Moral Guidance, supra note 72 (reporting that some of the document’s authors
believe that saving more life-years is relevant, while others disagree).
74. Monica Schoch-Spana et al., Influence of Community and Culture in the Ethical Allocation of
Scarce Medical Resources in a Pandemic Situation: Deliberative Democracy Study, 12 J. PARTICIPATORY MED. 7-8 (2020), https://jopm.jmir.org/2020/1/e18272/pdf [https://perma.cc/BF2WU5SG] (finding that over seventy percent of Maryland focus group participants and eightfive percent in a smaller Texas group regarded probability of survival as relevant, with fewer
than ten percent rejecting it, and that fifty percent or more in both groups regarded years of
life saved as relevant). These results echo findings in more abstract contexts. See, e.g., Mark
Kelman & Tamar Admati Kreps, Playing with Trolleys: Intuitions About the Permissibility of Aggregation, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 197, 205 (2014) (reporting that seventy-eight percent
of respondents believed that a scarce medicine must be allocated to save ten patients rather
than one, and that eighty-five percent believed allocating it to save ten was at least permissible).
75. Emanuel et al, supra note 1, at 4 (describing saving years of life as a “subordinate aim”); Mello,
Persad, & White, supra note 6, at 4 (constraining the goal of saving years of life to short-term
diﬀerences in life expectancy); cf. Moral Guidance, supra note 72.
76. For simplicity, I focus only on the goal of saving more lives. It is plausible that policies considering short-term life expectancy likewise save more years of life among people with disabilities, but the analysis is more complex.
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A. Evidence-Based Triage Benefits Many Patients with Disabilities
How evidence-based triage aﬀects a given patient or group depends on two
factors: (1) whether they are likely to need scarce, potentially lifesaving treatments, and (2) whether they are likely to benefit from those treatments. These
factors create three broad categories of patients:
1. Patients unlikely to need scarce, potentially lifesaving treatment, who will
be largely unaﬀected by triage policies.
2. Patients who are more likely to need these treatments, but have comparatively good prospects of benefit. They will likely fare better under evidence-based triage, which makes more treatments available to patients
who can benefit, than under random selection or minimal triage.
3. Patients who are more likely to need these treatments, yet have poor prospects of benefit even with them. They will likely fare worse under evidence-based triage than under random selection or minimal triage, although the diﬀerence may not be large given their limited prospects of
benefit even with treatment.
Because evidence-based triage aims to save more lives, the gains for patients
in the second group are expected to exceed the losses for patients in the third
group. Imagine a stylized triage scenario where the second group comprises
twenty patients with a fifty percent chance of survival and the third comprises
twenty with a ten percent chance; only twenty treatments are available. Evidence-based triage prioritizes the second group, saving ten lives. In contrast,
random selection, which treats the groups identically, saves five fewer lives in the
second group and only one more in the third.
In this Section, I suggest that there is reason to believe that the second group
of patients, those who need scarce treatments but can benefit from them, is likely
to contain a greater proportion of people with disabilities than the first group.
This, in combination with the fact that evidence-based triage aims at saving
more lives, makes it plausible that the people with disabilities who would be
saved only by evidence-based triage outnumber the people with disabilities in
the third group who would fare better under random selection or minimal triage.
The plausibility of this claim is not required for evidence-based triage to be legal
or ethical: law and morality value all patients, not only those with disabilities.
Nor is it suﬃcient for legality: a policy could illegally disadvantage patients with
specific disabilities even if it is better for most patients with disabilities.77 But it
77.
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Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 19 (arguing that antidiscrimination law “protect[s] individuals”);
see also Hensel & Wolf, supra note 15, at 741-61 (collecting cases).

evidence-based triage in a pandemic

helps to support the consonance of evidence-based triage with a disability advocacy approach that centers the interests of patients with disabilities.
The predicted benefits of evidence-based triage for many patients with disabilities undermine the generalization that evidence-based triage disadvantages
patients with disabilities.78 They also challenge Bagenstos’s suggestion that triage policies that consider disabilities “place the burden of resource scarcity on
disabled individuals” and his claim that “a process in which people with disabilities were equally represented vis-à-vis the nondisabled, and in which the interests of both groups were given equal concern” would exclude disability as a factor.79 And they similarly challenge the claim that considering probability of
survival or quantity of resources required would “significantly disadvantage people with disabilities.”80 Disability advocacy has compelling reasons to endorse
evidence-based triage policies that consider diﬀerences in patients’ prospect of
benefit and the quantity of resources they need, because many of the additional
lives saved by such policies will be the lives of patients with disabilities, since the
overwhelming majority of disabilities do not aﬀect these factors. Taking “equal
account of the interests of disabled people”81 does not mean treating all people
with disabilities the same—it means treating people diﬀerently when, and only
when, this is justified by their diﬀerences.
Bagenstos questions whether we can “know that a policy explicitly denying
treatment to some individuals based on their disabilities is going to benefit more
people with disabilities overall.”82 There is uncertainty here, but we certainly
cannot know that random selection or minimal triage will more eﬀectively avoid
“deny[ing] people with disabilities important benefits” or “forcing disabled individuals to face deadly consequences because of societal decisions not to invest
in suﬃcient treatments.”83 In fact, there are good reasons to believe that random
selection and minimal triage present greater risk of generating these undesirable
results. First, forcing hospitals to ignore evidence about prospect of benefit may

78.

79.
80.
81.
82.

83.

Ne’eman, supra note 5. This generalization parallels the broader fallacy that all disabilities are
identical. Cf. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985) (observing that individuals with intellectual disabilities are not “all cut from the same pattern”); Ouellette, supra note 56, at 174 (discussing diﬀerences between disabilities).
Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 11, 13.
Hellman & Nicholson, supra note 5, at 25; see also id. (claiming that giving equal ventilator
time to all patients would negatively aﬀect those with “pre-existing health conditions”).
Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 13.
Id. at 19. Proposals for evidence-based triage do not categorically exclude individuals with
disabilities, but instead use individualized determinations that consider whether a disability
aﬀects prospect of benefit. See supra Section I.A.
Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 10, 17.
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not be the best way of allowing “people with disabilities an equal chance to survive,”84 because disabilities likely also aﬀect the need for scarce, lifesaving treatment, making the number of treatments available relevant. For instance, given
the spread of COVID-19 in group housing,85 patients with disabilities (such as
sensory and intellectual disabilities) that do not limit their prospect of benefit
are likely to be overrepresented among COVID-19 patients.86 They therefore
have much to lose from a policy that makes fewer treatments available to patients
who can benefit, since such a policy not only leads to more deaths but concentrates those deaths among those likelier to contract COVID-19.87
Second, evidence-based triage could benefit patients with disabilities even
under the implausible assumption that disabilities only limit prospect of benefit
and do not increase the risk of contracting COVID-19. Assume, for instance, that
only five of the twenty COVID-19 patients with a greater prospect of benefit in
the example discussed above have disabilities, whereas all twenty patients with
a lesser prospect of benefit do.88 Even under these assumptions, evidence-based

84.

Hellman & Nicholson, supra note 5, at 25.
See, e.g., Jason Moon, More Than Three in Four N.H. COVID Deaths Occurred in Long-Term
Care Homes, N.H. PUB. RADIO (May 5, 2020), https://www.nhpr.org/post/more-three-fournh-covid-deaths-occurred-long-term-care-homes#stream [https://perma.cc/UF53-A3EN].
86. For instance, almost fifty percent of people over age seventy-five have hearing impairments,
and more than forty percent have cognitive impairment or dementia. See Nat’l Institute on
Aging, Hearing Loss: A Common Problem for Older Adults, NAT’L INST. HEALTH (Nov. 20, 2018),
https://www.nia.nih.gov/health/hearing-loss-common-problem-older-adults
[https://
perma.cc/778P-YG8D]; Kenneth M. Langa et al., A Comparison of the Prevalence of Dementia
in the United States in 2000 and 2012, 177 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 51, 55 (2017). More than sixty
percent of nursing home residents are over seventy-five. Long-Term Care Providers and Service
Users in the United States, 2015-2016, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATS. 20 (Feb. 2019), https://
www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_03/sr03_43-508.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RVH7-Z27F].
These patients benefit in two ways from policies that save more lives: directly from greater
access to scarce treatments for themselves, and indirectly from greater access for caregivers
and loved ones.
87. Cf. Ne’eman, supra note 5 (conceding that “[i]f someone needs twice the average amount of
time on a ventilator, maintaining that we shouldn’t turn them away . . . means that we are
potentially costing the lives of two people who come into the [intensive care unit] after them,”
but nevertheless endorsing a policy that saves fewer lives). Ne’eman does not address the possibility that the lives lost will be those of patients with disabilities.
88. Cf. Disability Impacts All of Us, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd
/disabilityandhealth/infographic-disability-impacts-all.html
[https://perma.cc/8LTAUGNJ] (reporting that over a quarter “of adults in the United States ha[s] some type of disability”). In reality, patients with preexisting disabilities may be more likely to contract
COVID-19, and many patients who are unlikely to benefit will not have preexisting disabilities.
85.
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triage would be expected to save more people with disabilities.89 A greater but
unequal chance of survival seems ethically preferable to a smaller but more equal
chance.90
Last, doubts that an evidence-based triage policy will in fact save more patients with disabilities would not end the analysis. As noted above, evidence that
evidence-based triage will benefit many patients with disabilities importantly
counters narratives that cast evidence-based triage as benefiting only patients
without disabilities while burdening all patients with disabilities. Further, if desired, an evidence-based triage policy could be made more favorable to patients
with disabilities by adding allocation criteria, rather than subtracting allocation
criteria by retreating to random selection or minimal triage. For instance, patients with disabilities who can benefit, or patients who are disadvantaged more
broadly, could be explicitly prioritized.91 Such an approach could still aim to save
more lives, while trying intentionally to ensure that people with disabilities comprise a fair number of those saved. Meanwhile, though it is important to aim for
accuracy in evidentiary determinations, randomness is not the solution to inaccuracy. Just as the problem of bias in medical care justifies anti-bias eﬀorts rather
than abandoning the potentially lifesaving enterprise of diagnosis and treatment
in favor of minimal or random approaches, the same is true regarding concerns
about bias in allocation.92
The more challenging question is when, if ever, we should accept saving
fewer lives overall in order to benefit patients with specific disabilities. While
disability policy sometimes allows for accommodations that present few tradeoﬀs between potential beneficiaries,93 such options are unlikely to be available

89.

90.
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Evidence-based triage would be expected to save ten patients: 2.5 with disabilities and 7.5
without. Random selection would be expected to save only six: 2.25 with disabilities (1.25 from
the group with good prospects of benefit and 1 from the group with poorer prospects of benefit) and 3.75 without.
Cf. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 131 (rev. ed. 1999) (permitting “inequalities” that “improve everyone’s situation, including that of the least advantaged”).
Cf. Douglas B. White et al., Model Hospital Policy for Fair Allocation of Scarce Medications to Treat
COVID-19, U. PITT. 1 (May 28, 2020), https://ccm.pitt.edu/sites/default/files/2020-0528b%20Model%20hospital%20policy%20for%20allocating%20scarce%20COVID%20meds
.pdf [https://perma.cc/BY3T-YJKL] (proposing to consider patients’ residence in a disadvantaged community as an allocation factor); Parag A. Pathak et al., Leaving No Ethical Value
Behind: Triage Protocol Design for Pandemic 12 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 26951, 2020), https://www.nber.org/papers/w26951 [https://perma.cc/V88B-G44X]
(suggesting the use of reserve categories to prioritize disabled or disadvantaged patients).
Cf. supra note 41 and related text. Contra Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 20 (arguing that concerns
about bias “should lead to great skepticism about the quality of the ‘evidence’”).
E.g., Adam M. Samaha, What Good Is the Social Model of Disability?, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251,
1298 (2007) (“Curb cuts are an example: at least for new construction, they cost little in the
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where scarce medical resources are concerned. In the face of scarcity, allocating
scarce resources–even resources that are scarce because of social policy determinations–requires a normative framework.94 A triage policy that is worse for individuals with specific disabilities cannot be dismissed as unjust discrimination
on that basis, but must be analyzed against a broader backdrop of normative
analysis that considers the claims of diﬀerent individuals and social groups.95
Saving more lives overall is a compelling starting point. By aiming to save more
lives, evidence-based triage aligns with widely adopted measures like physical
distancing and postponement of medical procedures; it aims to save more patients, including many patients with disabilities, even if this works to the disadvantage of patients with certain disabilities.

B. Evidence-Based Triage Protects Non-Visible Victims
In this Section, I challenge the claim that random selection serves the interests of politically marginalized people, including marginalized people with disabilities.96 While Bagenstos is right to demand that “decisions that deny people
with disabilities important benefits”97 be democratically legitimate, the tragedy
of scarcity is that every decision denies some people with disabilities important
benefits. Patients whose disabilities substantially reduce their prospect of benefit
can organize to oﬀer personal narratives in opposition to evidence-based triage,98 but allocation approaches that advantage those patients may poorly serve
the interests of patients with other disabilities. In contrast, the patients with and
without disabilities who fare worse under random selection are unaware of their
fate until the decision has been made and have no unified narrative to oﬀer policymakers. Advocacy should not mandate solidarity between people whose disabilities do not limit their prospect of benefit and those whose disabilities do
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short run and they benefit wheelchair users, stroller pushers, and skateboard riders over the
long run.”).
Id. at 1253 (observing that “deciding how to respond to ‘disability’ depends on a normative
framework . . . [that] might be libertarian, utilitarian, egalitarian, some combination thereof,
or something else,” and that “[t]here is no way to set priorities, make unavoidable tradeoﬀs,
or confront cost issues without a normative orientation”).
Cf. id. at 1308 (noting that while disability rights advocacy grows out of a social movement
perspective, “at some point . . . disability rights proponents might choose to confront more
eﬀectively the problems of limited resources and competing claims of justice,” and arguing
that “devotion to elevating the status of a single interest group is not conducive to that task”).
Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 10-11 (arguing that the political marginalization of people with
disabilities supports random selection).
Id. at 10.
See, e.g., Washington Complaint, supra note 5.
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limit their prospect of benefit.99 Rather, each patient, whatever their specific disability, should be considered as an individual.
Recognizing the multiple identities of patients with and without disabilities
challenges the view that democratic legitimacy favors minimal triage or random
selection,100 as well as the related view that minimal triage or random selection
best recognizes the equality of people with disabilities. While the passage of the
disability discrimination laws did not categorically exclude the nondisabled, it
likely did exclude or limit the participation of disadvantaged people with and
without disabilities. We should worry that elite decisionmakers might be attracted to formally equal approaches—like random or first-come, first-served allocation—that save fewer lives and thereby likely increase deaths among disadvantaged people with and without disabilities, but that impose few or no
burdens on better-oﬀ people who are less likely to need scarce, lifesaving treatments and are likelier to reach the hospital first if they do. Significantly, the community engagement research discussed earlier reveals broad rejection of both
lottery and first-come, first-served allocation, and underscores concerns that the
latter approach favors the better-oﬀ.101

99.

Govind Persad & David Wasserman, Diversity and Solidarity in Response to Covid-19, HASTINGS
CTR. (May 13, 2020), https://www.thehastingscenter.org/diversity-and-solidarity-in
-response-to-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/Z4BE-72GM] (“We should not force the person
whose disability doesn’t limit their prospect of benefit to be treated like others whose disabilities do limit their prospect of benefit, simply because both patients share the common ascribed identity of having a disability.”). Contra Ari Ne’eman, When It Comes to Rationing, Disability Rights Law Prohibits More than Prejudice, HASTINGS CTR. (Apr. 10, 2020),
https://www.thehastingscenter.org/when-it-comes-to-rationing-disability-rights-law
-prohibits-more-than-prejudice [https://perma.cc/8DWK-UPEJ] (arguing that the use of
triage principles that aim to save more lives but disadvantage patients with certain disabilities
“is inconsistent with the principle of solidarity at the core of the disability rights movement”).
100. Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 10-11 (arguing that “the political process that led to the enactment
of the disability discrimination laws did not exclude the nondisabled,” and that “[w]hen a
group passes a law to put burdens on itself, there is little reason to worry that it is failing to
take account of the full array of costs”). My concern about this claim is twofold: interpreting
the disability discrimination laws to preclude evidence-based triage does not only burden people without disabilities, and interpreting them in this way may inequitably burden disadvantaged people, both with and without disabilities, who were excluded from discussions around
the passage of those laws. Cf. SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE
DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 3-4 (2009) (recognizing that people with diﬀerent disabilities
often have disparate interests).
101. See Schoch-Spana et al., supra note 74, at 7; see also Organ Transplant Discrimination, supra note
17, at 44 (discussing potential unfairness of first-come, first-served transplant allocation to
people with disabilities); Univ. of Colo. Ctr. for Bioethics and Humanities, Crisis Triage and
People with Disabilities: Historical Lessons for a Time of COVID, YOUTUBE (Apr. 24, 2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o1wxhQndikI&feature=youtu.be&t=1531 (statement of
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Ultimately, rather than assisting those “most likely to have been excluded”102
from policymaking, random selection and minimal triage would increase risk for
many disadvantaged people and people with disabilities, while protecting the
interests of a small group that is better positioned to organize.103 Cross-disability
advocacy should acknowledge, not downplay, this problem. While Bagenstos
recognizes potential tradeoﬀs when he suggests that “[m]aybe denying lifesaving treatment to individuals with cystic fibrosis could save more individuals who
take daily medication for high blood pressure,”104 this example goes astray in two
ways. First, evidence-based triage involves individualized determinations, not
categorical denial of treatment to all cystic fibrosis patients. Second, Bagenstos
compares cystic fibrosis to high blood pressure, a common condition many
would regard as less significant than cystic fibrosis. Here is a better example: in
scarcity, denying lifesaving treatment to those patients whose cystic fibrosis
makes them comparatively unlikely to benefit could save more patients with cystic
fibrosis who are nevertheless likely to benefit. This outcome is achievable under evidence-based triage, which considers individualized evidence about benefit, but
is foreclosed both by minimal triage—which mandates ignoring the diﬀerence
between the possibility of benefit and its likelihood—and by random selection.
C. The Social Origins of Scarcity Cannot Justify Sacrificing Lives
Bagenstos and others rightly observe that scarcity stems not just from
COVID-19, but from social and political decisions to underinvest in testing and
equipment.105 But the social origins of scarcity do not support random selection
or minimal triage.106 Some suggest that adopting these approaches would encourage decisionmakers to more vigorously prevent initial scarcity.107 This as-
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Julie Reiskin, Executive Dir. of Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition) (describing her organization’s rejection of first-come, first-served allocation). These findings complicate the claim
that “many people believe” lottery allocation “would be fairer.” Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 21.
Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 11.
Cf. Deborah A. Small, On the Psychology of the Identifiable Victim Eﬀect, in IDENTIFIED VERSUS
STATISTICAL LIVES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE 13-23 (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., 2015)
(describing psychological biases that favor visible, identifiable individuals over disadvantaged
groups).
Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 19.
Id. at 13.
Cf. Samaha, supra note 93, at 1253 (observing that the causal origins of disadvantage are separable from policy prescriptions to address disadvantage).
David Orentlicher, Destructuring Disability: Rationing of Health Care and Unfair Discrimination
Against the Sick, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 49, 73 (1996) (supporting random selection in
part because if “decisionmakers realize that they cannot fully control the outcome of rationing
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sumption lacks evidentiary support. And it becomes implausible when opposition to triage policies involves inviting the same federal oﬃcials who inadequately managed the initial COVID-19 response108 to now control how others
respond to the scarcity they produced.109
Concentrating power in the hands of those responsible for scarcity will likely
undermine, not increase, incentives to prevent scarcity. Disability advocates and
others would therefore be wise to reject, for instance, recent proposals to allow
the federal government to deny ventilators from the Strategic National Stockpile
to any state that the Secretaries of HHS and of Homeland Security judge to be
allocating ventilators in a discriminatory fashion.110 Such an approach would afford federal administrators largely unguided power to deny states ventilators, a
particularly unwise decision given existing concerns about politicized and otherwise unjustified federal allocation of scarce COVID-19 treatments.111 It would
also be inconsistent with HHS’s recognition that state decisionmakers “have the
greatest insight into community-level needs in the COVID-19 response.”112 And,
even if it accurately identified discrimination, this approach would impose double jeopardy on residents of states with discriminatory policies by denying them
access to ventilators. A preferable approach, which would avoid undesirable
“federal superintendence of treatment decisions traditionally entrusted to state
governance,”113 would permit states and localities to adopt triage policies that
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decisions and that therefore treatments they might need when they become patients might be
denied, they might be more generous in allocating resources for health care coverage”).
See, e.g., Terry Gross, Reporter: White House Knew of Coronavirus’ ‘Major Threat,’ but Response
Fell Short, NPR (Mar. 12, 2020, 1:20 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/2020/03/12
/814881355/white-house-knew-coronavirus-would-be-a-major-threat-but-response-fellshort [https://perma.cc/N425-3XUK].
See Washington Complaint, supra note 5, at 4 (calling on the HHS Oﬃce of Civil Rights “to
act swiftly to clearly and firmly articulate the violation of civil rights” caused by Washington’s
triage plan).
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR, AND PENSIONS, 116TH CONG. DISCUSSION
DRAFT OF EQUAL CARE ACT, at 2 (2020) https://www.sasse.senate.gov/public/_cache/files
/3a8bb77f-d4ad-4ab5-a81a-6f1a6b0cc6fd/bon20137.pdf [https://perma.cc/7224-DTLS].
Jonathan Allen, Phil McCausland & Cyrus Farivar, Want a Mask Contract or Some Ventilators?
A White House Connection Helps, NBCNEWS (Apr. 24, 2020, 5:01 AM EDT), https://
www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/political-influence-skews-trump-s-coronavirus
-response-n1191236 [https://perma.cc/Y634-GTUE]; Lev Facher, Trump Administration Announces Plan to Distribute Covid-19 Drug amid Concerns over Allocation, STAT (May 9, 2020),
https://www.statnews.com/2020/05/09/trump-administration-announces-plan-to
-distribute-covid-19-drug-amid-concerns-over-allocation
[https://perma.cc/2CYDWZXZ].
Facher, supra note 111.
Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 643 (1986) (plurality opinion); see also Lesley v.
Chie, 250 F.3d 47, 54 (1st Cir. 2001) (similar).
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mitigate harms resulting from federally exacerbated shortages, while allowing
courts to use the established tools of disability law to address any concerns that
these policies unfairly discriminate on the basis of disability.
Conclusion
I have argued that random selection and minimal triage are not required by
law, and would be worse than evidence-based triage for patients with and without disabilities. Instead of advocating for federal intervention to impose these
approaches, disability advocates would do better to support the adoption of evidence-based state triage guidelines that are responsive to public input, and to
ensure that these guidelines are free of biased or unsupported assumptions about
disabled patients.114 They could also eﬀectively marshal disability law in support
of eﬀorts to reduce scarcity and limit the spread of illness to vulnerable patients.115 Developing evidence-based triage guidelines, while working to reduce
scarcity, is the most eﬀective way to save people with and without disabilities
from COVID-19.
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See, e.g., Meredith Cohn, Who Gets a Ventilator when There’s a Crush of Coronavirus Patients?
Maryland Is Coming Up with a Plan, BALT. SUN (Mar. 28, 2020, 3:34 PM), https://
www.baltimoresun.com/coronavirus/bs-hs-ventilator-surge-plan-20200327dnguwrﬀ7vcr3sg45negc3na-story.html [https://perma.cc/8ZUJ-NFJJ]; Elise Young & David
Voreacos, N.J. Starts Thinking Over How to Ration Scarce Ventilators, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Mar.
26, 2020, 7:23 PM EDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-26/n-jforms-ethics-panel-to-guide-decisions-on-scarce-ventilators [https://perma.cc/VF88-6P7V].
E.g., First Amended Class Action Complaint & Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Costa v.
Bazron, No. 1-19-cv-3185 (RDM) (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 2020) (alleging that the COVID-19 response at a psychiatric hospital violates the ADA).

